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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 5 USNATO 0979

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, MILI, NATO, OR, XF, XG, XI

SUBJ: NATO STUDY ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF REOPENING THE SUEZ CANAL

REF: A. USNATO 0897 B. STATE 038651

1. ON FEB 21, POLADS BEGAN PARA-BY- PARA REVIEW OF IS DRAFT REPORT ON IMPLICATIONS OF SUEZ REOPENING. U.S. REP AMONG OTHER INDICATED HE WAS WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS AND WAS PARTICIPATING IN DISCUSSION ON PERSONAL BASIS ONLY. HE WOULD THEREFORE RESERVE ON ALL PARAS CONSIDERED IN THIS FIRST READING. A NUMBER OF POLADS, HOWEVER, DID HAVE INSTRUCTIONS AND CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS WAS MADE IN RECASTING FIRST 18 PARAS OF THE IS DRAFT.

2. POLADS WILL RETURN TO WORK ON SUEZ STUDY AT REGULAR MEETING ON FEB 25 AND WILL CONTINUE TO MEET TWO TIMES PER WEEK UNTIL STUDY IS COMPLETED.

3. COMPLETE IS DRAFT IS MADE UP OF THREE PARTS. THE BASIC REPORT (19 PAGES) WAS REPORTED TO DEPARTMENT REF A. ANNEX I CONSISTS ENTIRELY OF MAPS AND CHARTS ON WHICH MISSION REQUIRES NO GUIDANCE. ANNEX II IS SET FORTH BELOW. NUMBERED PARAS ARE THE FOOTNOTES TO THE BASIC REPORT.

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4. REQUEST GUIDANCE IN TIME FOR FEB 25 POLADS. MISSION RECOGNIZES THIS TIME IS BRIEF FOR COMMENTS ON SUCH A LENGTHY REPORT; HOWEVER, COMMITTEE IS ANXIOUS TO MOVE RAPIDLY AS ITS PREVIOUS POLADS STUDY (ON SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS) WAS CRITICIZED BY

NAC FOR BEING TOO LONG IN PREPARATION. IF DEPARTMENT COMMENTS ON ENTIRE REPORT ARE UNAVAILABLE, PARTIAL INSTRUCTIONS WOULD BE MOST APPRECIATED.

5. BEGIN TEXT ANNEX II:

ANNEX II TO THE REPORT ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE
REOPENING OF THE SUEZ CANAL

1. THE OPERATION TO CLEAR THE CANAL OF EXPLOSIVES WAS LARGELY COMPLETED BY THE END OF 1974. SOME SHALLOW DRAUGHT EGYPTIAN VESSELS PASSED THROUGH THE CANAL LAST NOVEMBER BUT BEFORE IT CAN BE FULLY RE-OPENED THE SUEZ CANAL AUTHORITY (SCA) WILL HAVE TO COMPLETE THE REMOVAL OF SUNKEN WRECKS, REPAIR THE BED AND BANKS OF THE CANAL AND INSTALL NEW TELECOMMUNICATIONS, EQUIPMENT AND NAVIGATIONAL AIDS. SCA ESTIMATES THAT IF THEIR PROGRAMME IS ADHERED TO IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO RE-OPEN THE CANAL FOR COMMERCIAL SHIPPING WITH A MAXIMUM DRAUGHT OF 38 FEET (THE PRE-1967 DRAUGHT) BETWEEN THE END OF APRIL AND THE END OF JUNE 1975. WE THINK THIS TIMING OPTIMISTIC AND THAT THE CANAL IS UNLIKELY TO BE BACK AT ITS PRE-1967 CONDITION MUCH BEFORE THE END OF 1975.

THE 38 FEET DRAUGHT LIMIT WILL ONLY RESTORE THE CANAL TO ITS PRE-SIX DAY WAR CAPACITY AND THE EGYPTIANS HAVE RECOGNIZED THAT A MAJOR PROPORTION OF THE WORLD'S TANKER SHIPPING WILL BE UNABLE TO TRANSIT. THEY HAVE THEREFORE DEVISED A TWO-STAGE PLAN FOR ENLARGEMENT. STAGE 1, TAKING 3 YEARS TO COMPLETE, WOULD BE TO PERMIT THE PASSAGE OF SHIPS WITH A DRAUGHT OF 53 FEET; HSTAGE 2, ALSO ESTIMATED AS TAKING A FURTHER 3 YEARS, WOULD ENLARGE THE WATERWAY TO TAKE SHIPS OF UP TO 70 FEET DRAUGHT. THE THREE DRAUGHTS QUOTED ABOVE REPRESENT FOR OIL TANKERS DEAD WEIGHT TONNAGES (DWT) OF ABOUT 50,000, 150,000 AND AT LEAST 250,000 DWT RESPECTIVELY.

THE SCA HAS BEGUN TRAINING CANAL PILOTS AND PLANS TO HAVE AT LEAST 120 QUALIFIED BY 1ST APRIL. IN ADDITION, IT HAS PLACED A \$169 MILLION CONTRACT WITH A JAPANESE FIRM TO DEEPEN AND WIDEN THE WATERWAY. WORK IS TO BEGIN IN THE LAST HALF OF 1975 AND BE COMPLETED BY MID-1979.

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2. FREEDOM OF PASSAGE FOR ISRAELI SHIPS REMAINS A MAJOR ISSUE. THE EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER STATED RECENTLY THAT NO ISRAELI SHIP WOULD BE ABLE TO USE THE CANAL UNTIL THERE WAS AN OVERALL MIDDLE EAST PEACE SETTLEMENT. THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER LATER SAID THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAD ALREADY SECRETLY AGREED THAT ISRAELI SHIPS COULD USE THE CANAL AT SOME STAGE OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. WE THINK THAT, IN THE EVENT, THE EGYPTIANS WILL FIND IT HARD TO BRING THEMSELVES TO ALLOW PASSAGE RIGHTS TO ANY ISRAELI SHIPS FOR SOME TIME AND MAY WELL NEVER ACCEPT ISRAELI WARSHIPS. THERE WILL PROBABLY BE PRESSURES ON INSRAEL NOT TO PRESS THIS ISSUE TOO HARD; SHE HAS HER OWN LAND BRIDGE BETWEEN THE RED SEA AND THE MEDITERRANEAN AND CAN DO WITHOUT THE CANAL PROVIDED SHE RETAINS ACCESS TO THE RED SEA.

3. THE SOVIET NAVY WILL NO LONGER LIMIT ITSELF TO TERRITORIAL WATERS BUT WILL, BY ITS PRESENCE AROUND THE WORLD IN TIME OF PEACE, EXTEND COMMUNIST INFLUENCE BEYOND THE BORDERS OF THE USSR (ADMIRAL GORCHKOV, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF).

4. ALTHOUGH BOTH SHIPS (KIEV AND MINSK) ARE FITTED WITH AN ANGLED DECK, IT IS NOT THOUGHT THAT THEY WILL BE CAPABLE OF OPERATING FIXED WING AIRCRAFT, AND THEIR MOST PROBABLE COMPLEMENT SEEMS LIKELY TO BE A MIX OF V/STOL AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTERS.

5. THE SOVIET MERCHANT FLEET TO A LARGE DEGREE PERFORMS AN ESSENTIAL FUNCTION OF LONG-RANGE LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR THEIR NAVAL FORCES. IN 1956, THE SOVIETS HAD 1,000 MERCHANT SHIPS TALLING AT 2,300,000 TONS. TODAY, THEY HAVE EXPANDED THEIR MERCHANT FLEET TO 6,500 SHIPS TALLING 16,200,000 TONS.

6. SINCE SEPTEMBER 1967, SPACE VEHICLE RECOVERY SHIPS-MANNED BY THE NAVY - AND OTHER SHIPS HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED TO THE INDIAN OCEAN IN SUPPORT OF THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMME. OTHER NAVAL SHIPS HAVE CARRIED OUT OCEANOGRAPHIC AND HYDROGRAPHIC RESEARCH, AND IT MUST BE ASSUMED THAT SOME HAVE COLLECTED INTELLIGENCE. BEFORE THE ARRIVAL OF THE SPACE SUPPORT SHIPS THERE HAD BEEN NO SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY IN THE OCEAN APART FROM OCCASIONAL OPERATIONS BY SURVEY SHIPS AND TRANSIT BY WARSHIPS.

7. OTHER EVALUATIONS INDICATE THAT THE FORCE NOW AVERAGES
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ONE DESTROYER, FOUR ESCORTS, ONE AMPHIBIOUS SHIP AND ONE SUBMARINE, AND IS USUALLY AUGMENTED BY A CRUISER DURING DEC AND JAN. ON 21ST JAN , 1975, IT CONSISTED OF THE FOLLOWING UNITS: TWO SUBMARINES, SIX COMBATANTS, ONE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR AND SEVEN AUXILIARIES.

8. THE MAIN GROUP OF SOVIET WARSHIPS HAVE CONTINUED TO SPEND MOST OF THEIR TIME IN THE ARABIAN SEA AND THE GULF OF ADEN, WITH FREQUENT BUT IRREGULAR VISITS TO IRAQI PORTS. A PATROL WAS MAINTAINED IN THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ BETWEEN MAY AND AUGUST, PARTLY BY AN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION VESSEL (AGI) AND APARTLY BY A MINE-SWEEPER; THE AGI WAS SUBSEQUENTLY SEEN OFF DIEGO GARCIA BEFORE RETURNING TO THE PACIFIC. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME SINCE THE INDO-PAKISTANI WAR THAT THE PRESENCE OF AN AGI HAS BEEN NOTED. MOREOVER, THE RUSSIANS HAVE SINCE JULY BEEN CARRYING OUT MINE-CLEARANCE OPERATIONS IN THE STRAITS OF GUBAL AT THE ENTRANCE TO THE GULF OF SUEZ, WITH A FORCE OF FOURTEEN SHIPS, INCLUDING THE HELICOPTER-CARRIER LENINGRAD, AND MISSILE-ARMED DESTROYER FROM THE BLACK SEA FLEET. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THAT A HELICOPTER-CRUISER HAS BEEN DEPLOYED SO FAR AFIELD. (IT SUBSEQUENTLY VISITED MAURITIUS.)

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9. SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS DURING THE INDO-PAKISTANI WAS
EVENTUALLY BROUGHT THEIR FORCE LEVEL THERE TO EIGHT SURFACE
COMBATANTS, FOUR SUBMARINES, AND SOME AUXILIARIES. FOLLOWING THE
ARAB-ISRAELI WAR OF 1973, THE SOVIETS ALSO SENT ADDITIONAL UNITS
INTO THE AREA.

10. SOVIET PENETRATION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN.

A. RED SEA OUTLETS

IT IS IN THE SOVIET UNION'S INTEREST TO ENSURE FREEDOM
OF NAVIGATION FOR ITS SHIPS IN ALL CIRCUMSTANCES BETWEEN THE
MEDITERRANEAN AND THE INDIAN OCEAN BY PROMOTING THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF SOCIALIST REGIMES IN THIS AREA TOO, AND BY SECURING BASES.

(I) SOMALI DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

IN THE SOMALI DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, THE RUSSIANS HACE
GAINED INFLUENCE, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE 1969 MILITARY
COUP. THEY TRAIN AND EQUIP THE SOMALI ARMED FORCES,
AND SINCE EARLY 1972 REGULAR USE HAS BEEN MADE OF
BERBERAS ALONGSIDE BERTHS FOR MAINTENANCE,
REPLENISHMENT AND HARBOUR TRAINING, AND A SMALL SOVIET
NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS STATION HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED.

"SOMALIA, IN TURN, HAS ALSO RECEIVED MODERN ARMS FROM THE
KREMLIN. AT BERBERA, THE SOVIETS HAVE ACCESS TO PORT
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FACILITIES AND HAVE ESTABLISHED A COMMUNICATIONS STATION
THERE. SINCE LATE 1972, THE Y HAVE INCREASED THEIR USE OF
THE PORT AND NOW HAVE AN ALMOST CONTINUOUS PRESENCE THERE.
IN THE LAST TWO YEARS, THEY HAVE ALSO MAINTAINED A BARRACKS/
MINOR REPAIR SHIP THERE.

ACCORDING TO CERTAIN UNCONFIRMED REPORTS, THE SOVIET
NAVY ALSO HAS A REPAIR SHIP AND A CREW DEPOT SHIP

THERE. THE RUSSIANS HAVE NOT SO FAR ACQUIRED AIR FACILITIES, THOUGH A NEW AIRFIELD, NOW NEARING COMPLETION, WOULD BE CAPABLE OF HANDLING LONG-RANGE RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT.

A TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND CO-OPERATION WAS SIGNED BY THE SOMALI DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AND THE SOVIET UNION ON 11TH JULY, 1974, IN MOGADISHU, DURING MR. PODGORNYY'S VISIT. THE FIRST THREE ARTICLES OF THE TREATY PROVIDE FOR CLOSER CO-OPERATION IN A WIDE RANGE OF SPHERES (INDUSTRY, AGRICULTURE, TOURISM, ETC.).

ARTICLE 4 CONCERNS MILITARY CO-OPERATION AND STATES THAT WITH THE AIM OF STRENGTHENING THE DEFENCE CAPABILITY OF THE SOMALI DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES WILL CONTINUE TO EXTEND THEIR CO-OPERATION IN THE MILITARY FIELD, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SPECIAL AGREEMENTS ALREADY CONCLUDED. IT GOES ON TO SAY THAT CO-OPERATION WILL, IN PARTICULAR, TAKE THE FORM OF ASSISTANCE TO THE SOMALI ARMED FORCES IN THE SPHERES OF MILITARY TRAINING AND INSTRUCTION IN THE USE OF THE WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT SUPPLIED TO THE SOMALI DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC FOR THE PURPOSE OF STRENGTHENING ITS DEFENCE CAPABILITY.

ARTICLE 8 PROVIDES FOR PERIODIC CONSULTATIONS, AS THE NEED ARISES, ON IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL OR BILATERAL QUESTIONS. ARTICLE 9 STIPULATES THAT SHOULD A PROBLEM ARISE WHICH IS LIKELY TO IMPERIL PEACE, THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES WILL MEET AS A MATTER OF URGENCY AND CONSULT ON HOW TO COUNTER THE DANGER AND PRESERVE PEACE. THE OTHER ARTICLES CONCERN MORE GENERAL QUESTIONS.

IN EXCHANGE FOR THE TREATY, THE SOVIET UNION HAS
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APPARENTLY CANCELLED MOST OF THE ACCUMULATED DEBT INCURRED BY SUCCESSIVE SOMALI GOVERNEMENTS SINCE INDEPENDENCE, AND ACCEPTED A NEW TIME-PHASING FOR THE REST. THE CANCELLATION OF ECONOMIC AID AND MILITARY DEBTS IS A MOST UNUSUAL CONCESSION FOR THE RUSSIANS TO MAKE, AND, IF TRUE, UNDERLINES THE IMPORTANCE WHICH THEY ATTACH TO THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE SOMALIS. THE AMOUNT OF THIS DEBT IS ESTIMATED AT SOME \$90 MILLION.

(II) SOVIET AID TO THE SOMALI ARMED FORCES.

AIR FORCE. THE SOMALI AIR FORCE IS UNDERSTOOD TO BE EQUIPPED WITH MIG 15S AND MIG 17S (ABOUT 25) AND 10 OR SO MIG 21S. THERE ARE ALSO ABOUT 10 ILYUSHIN 28S, ANTONOV 24S AND 14S AND THE SAME NUMBER OF HEAVY AND

LIGHT HELICOPTERS (M1 AND M8 TYPES). IT SEEMS THAT ABOUT THIRTY PILOTS HAVE BEEN TRAINED IN RUSSIA AND THAT THE AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTERS ARE MAINTAINED BY SOVIET PERSONNEL. IN MAKING THE SOMALI AIR FORCE DEPENDENT ON THEM FOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT AND MAINTENANCE, THE RUSSIANS' AIM IS APPARENTLY TO EXERCISE CONTROL OVER THIS IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF THE SOMALI ARMED FORCES.

THERE ARE REPORTS THAT FOR SOME TIME THE RUSSIANS HAVE BEEN ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN BUILDING A MILITARY BASE AT UANLE UEN, 100 KMS NORTH-WEST OF MOGADISHU. THIS BASE IS APPARENTLY DESIGNED TO BECOME THE CAPITAL'S MILITARY AIRFIELD. UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF ONE OF THE CLAUSES OF THE SECRET MILITARY AGREEMENT REPORTEDLY SIGNED LAST JULY AT THE SAME TIME AS THE SOMALI-SOVIET TREATY, IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS NEW AIRFIELD WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE SOVIET AIR FORCE AS A STAGING AREA. IT SEEMS THAT UANLE UEN IS NOW BEING GIVEN PRIORITY OVER BERBERA, WHERE CONSTRUCTION WORK HAS BEEN SLOWED DOWN, BECAUSE IT IS BETTER SITUATED FOR LONG-RANGE AIRCRAFT AND EASIER TO DEFEND.

IN THE FIELD OF AIR DEFENCE, IT IS REPORTED THAT SAM 102 AND 103 ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILE SITES ARE BEING
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BUILT AND THAT SAM-7 MOBILE UNITS HAVE BEEN SUPPLIED TO THE AIR FORCE.

ARMY. IT SEEMS THAT THE SOMALI ARMY HAS 200 T34 AND 40 T54 TANKS.

NAVY. NAVAL UNITS INCLUDE TWO MISSILE-LAUNCHING CRAFT BASED AT BERBERA AND FIVE P6 FAST TORPEDO BOATS.

SOVIET EXPERTS. SOME 800 CIVILIAN AND MILITARY EXPERTS ARE UNDERSTOOD TO BE SECONDED TO THE SOMALI ARMY. THEY ARE HEADED BY A MAJOR GENERAL, WITH SIX COLONELS UNDER HIM RESPONSIBLE FOR EACH OF THE OPERATIONAL SECTORS COMMON TO ALL ARMIES, IN WHICH THE EXPERTS ARE EMPLOYED. THIS CHAIN OF COMMAND RUNS PARALLEL TO THAT OF THE SOMALI ARMY, SO THE RUSSIANS SEEM TO EXERCISE NO DIRECT AUTHORITY WITHIN UNITS. IT IS WORTH NOTING THAT IN THE 1ST SEPTEMBER ISSUE OF THE SOMALI MINISTRY OF INFORMATION'S DAILY BULLETIN "SONNA", PROMINENCE WAS GIVEN TO THE DENIAL PUBLISHED ON 31ST AUGUST BY TASS REGARDING THE REPORTED INSTALLATION OF THREE RUSSIAN MILITARY BASES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. THE SOMALI GOVERNMENT THUS AGAIN PROTESTED AGAINST "GROUNDLESS ALLEGATIONS" THAT

SOVIET BASES HAD ACTUALLY BEEN SET UP ON ITS
TERRITORY.

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(III) PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN (PDRY)

SOVIET ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID HAS BEEN SUPPLIED
SINCE 1968 TO THE PDRY, WHERE THE RUSSIANS HAVE ALSO
ACQUIRED POLITICAL INFLUENCE AND ACCESS TO FACILITIES.
THE INDIAN OCEAN SQUADRON NOW HAS VIRTUALLY
UNRESTRICTED USE OF PORT FACILITIES AT ADEN.

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE PDRY'S RULING NATIONAL
FRONT, ABDUL FATTAH ISMAIL, VISITED MOSCOW IN JULY
TOGETHER WITH THE PDRY FOREIGN MINISTER SALEH MUTIE.
THE RUSSIANS ARE REPORTED TO HAVE AGREED TO A
PROTOCOL PROVIDING FOR THE CANCELLATION OF PDRY'S DEBTS
AND THE POSTPONEMENT OF LOAN INSTALMENTS AND THEY MAY
HAVE OFFERED A NEW LOAN TO THE PDRY. WE DO NOT YET
KNOW EXACTLY WHAT THE PROTOCOL MEANS UT IT SEEMS
POSSIBLE THAT THE PDRY IS TO BE GIVEN THE SAME
FINANCIAL RELIEF AS SOMALIA. IN RETURN THE PDRY MAY
BE EXPECTED TO PURSUE A MORE FLEXIBLE FOREIGN POLICY
AND TO ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS IN THE GULF.

(IV)YEMENI ARAB REPUBLIC (YAR)

IN THE YEMENI ARAB REPUBLIC, WHERE THE CHINESE ARE

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JUST AS ACTIVE AS THE RUSSIANS, THE MODERATE LINE TAKEN

BY THE REGIME AND THE INCREASING INFLUENCE OF SAUDI ARABIA PREVENT THE COMMUNISTS FROM PLAYING A MAJOR POLITICAL ROLE. THE RUSSIANS HAVE SUPPLIED SUBSTANTIAL QUANTITIES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT, INCLUDING AIRCRAFT, TO THE YAR, BUT THE YEMENIS ARE WARY OF SOVIET LANDISHMENTS AND SUSCEPTIBLE TO PRESSURE FROM SAUDI ARABIA.

(V) SUDAN

BEFORE THE ABORTIVE COMMUNIST COUP IN JULY 1971, THE SUDANESE RELIED HEAVILY ON SOVIET MILITARY AND OTHER AID, BUT SOVIET INFLUENCE HAS SINCE DECLINED MARKEDLY.

(VI) ETHIOPIA

SOVIET EFFORTS IN ETHIOPIA HAVE ALSO HAD LITTLE SUCCESS. SINCE THE MILITARY TAKE-OVER IN ETHIOPIA AND THE REMOVAL OF EMPEROR HAILE SELASSIE THERE HAS BEEN NO EVIDENCE OF SOVIET INSPIRATION BEHIND THE ACTIONS OF THE PROVISIONAL MILITARY COUNCIL (FORMERLY THE ARMED FORCES' CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE), ALTHOUGH THE LATTER WILL NO DOUBT BE LOOKING TO THE RUSSIANS AMONGST OTHERS AS AN ALTERNATIVE SOURCE OF ARMS SUPPLY TO THE UNITED STATES. IT IS TOO EARLY, HOWEVER, TO ASSESS WHETHER THE RUSSIANS MAY BE ABLE TO IMPROVE THEIR POSITION IN THE NEW SITUATION. THEY ARE LIKELY TO BE CAUTIOUS IN THEIR APPROACH TO THE NEW ETHIOPIAN REGIME FOR FEAR OF PREJUDICING THEIR RELATIONS WITH SOMALIA. HOWEVER, THE SOVIET UNION, AFTER A PERIOD OF CAUTIOUS EXPECTATION, IS NOW OPENLY STARTING TO SUPPORT THE NEW REGIME, AS PROVEN BY THE CULTURAL RELATIONS NEWLY ESTABLISHED. ON 5TH JANUARY, 1975, THE PROVISIONAL MILITARY ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL ANNOUNCED THE SIGNING OF A CULTURAL AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH FOLLOWS ITS PLEDGE LAST MONTH TO TURN THE COUNTRY INTO A SOCIALIST STATE WITH A ONE-PARTY SYSTEM. THE TIMING IS NOT WITHOUT INTEREST IN THAT IN RECENT MONTHS RUSSIA IS BELIEVED TO HAVE INCREASED ITS BACKING OF THE ERITREAN LIBERATIONS FRONT THROUGH ITS ARAB SECRET

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B. PERSIAN GULF OUTLETS

THE SOVIET UNION MAY BE TRYING TO PUT ITSELF IN A POSITION WHERE IT CAN INTERFERE WITH THE REGULAR PRODUCTION AND SHIPMENT OF WESTERN OIL SUPPLIES, ESPECIALLY BY ENCOURAGING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LEFT-WING REGIMES.

(I) IRAQ

IN THE GULF, THE MAIN FOCUS OF SOVIET ACTIVITIES HAS

BEEN IRAQ, WHERE THE RUSSIANS HAVE PROVIDED MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID (LARGELY TO DEVELOP THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY) AND HELP WITH AIRFIELD AND PORT DEVELOPMENT. IN PARTICULAR THEY PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE MODERNISATION OF THE UMM QASR PORT FACILITIES. MOSCOW IS BACKING IRAQ'S PERSIAN GULF POLICY, MAINTAINS A MILITARY MISSION BAGHDAD AND FURNISHES VIRTUALLY ALL THE EQUIPMENT USED BY THE IRAQI ARMY. THE SOVIET-IRAQI TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND CO-OPERATION OF APRIL 1972 PROVIDED FOR DEFENCE COLLABORATION, WHICH COULD BE INTERPRETED TO INCLUDE SOVIET USE OF IRAQI PORTS AND AIRFIELDS. BUT APART FROM A FEW VISITS BY NAVAL VESSELS TO BASRA AND UMM QASR, THERE HAVE BEEN NO INDICATIONS SO FAR THAT THE RUSSIANS RELY ON ACCESS TO IRAQI FACILITIES FOR OPERATIONS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN(#). THE SOVIET UNION IS PROVIDING

(#) ACCORDING TO UNCONFIRMED REPORT, SOVIET PILOTS, UNDER THE GUISS OF VOLUNTEERS, ARE FLYING MIG 23 FIGHTER-BOMBERS OVER IRAN AND THE GULF STATES.

MATERIAL AID FOR THE REBELLION IN DHOFAR THROUGH THE AGENCY OF IRAQ AND SOUTH YEMEN. SOVIET INTEREST IN IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH IRAN IS AN IMPORTANT CONSTRAINT ON ITS RELATION WITH IRAQ (SEE FOLLOWING ITEM).

(II) IRAN

THE RIVALRY BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ IS A NOTEWORTHY
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FACTOR, IN VIEW OF IRAN'S EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH ITSELF AS THE DOMINANT POWER IN THE GULF. THE DISPUTE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES DATES BACK TO 1969, WHEN THE SHAH DENOUNCED A TREATY ON NAVIGATION IN THE SHATT AL 'ARAB, WHICH IS THE OIL PORT OF BASRA'S ONLY EXIT TO THE PERSIAN GULF. IRAQ CLAIMS THAT THE FRONTIER RUNS ALONG THE EASTERN BANK OF THE RIVER, WHILE IRAN IS SEEKING TO ESTABLISH IT DOWN THE MIDDLE. THE DISPUTE HAS ALREADY GIVEN RISE TO MANY SKIRMISHES AND IRAQ HAS ALSO BEEN INVOLVED IN KUWAIT ON THE SAME ISSUE. AN ATTEMPT TO FIND A COMPROMISE BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN TOOK PLACE IN ISTANBUL IN JANUARY 1975, BUT CAME TO NOTHING. BASICALLY, THE QUARREL STEMS FROM THE FACT THAT IRAN, THANKS TO ITS ENORMOUS OIL REVENUES, IS ACQUIRING A PREDOMINANT MILITARY POSITION IN THE GULF (IT HAS, FOR INSTANCE, RECENTLY CONCLUDED AN AGREEMENT WITH OMAN FOR THE JOINT COUNTRIL OF THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ), AND IS THEREFORE SETTING ITSELF UP AGAINST IRAQ, A

"PROGRESSIVE" COUNTRY AND, WHAT IS MORE, A CLIENT OF THE SOVIET UNION. IT WILL BE REMEMBERED THAT IRAN OCCUPIED UNOPPOSED THE TINY TUMBS ISLANDS WHICH COMMAND THE ENTRANCE TO THE GULF. IRAN HAS, MOREOVER, ALWAYS SOUGHT TO CONTAIN SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE REGION. FOR EXAMPLE, IT SUPPORTS THE OMAN GOVERNMENT AGAINST THE DHOFAR REBELLION, WHICH IS BACKED BY IRAQ, SOUTH YEMEN AND THE SOVIET UNION. THE SHAH IS ALSO WORRIED ABOUT MOSCOW'S DESIGNS ON THE PORT OF UMM QASR, WHERE IT HAS APPARENTLY OBTAINED FACILITIES. THE RUSSIANS, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAVE ALWAYS SOUGHT TO MAINTAIN AN EQUAL BALANCE BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ. TO ALL INTENTS AND PURPOSES, TEHERAN MAY BE DEEMED TO BE CLOSER TO THE WEST THAN TO THE EAST, BUT DUE ACCOUNT SHOULD BE TAKEN OF THE DEVELOPMENTS RESULTING FROM THE RISE IN OIL PRICES, WHICH HAVE GREATLY INCREASED IRAN'S POLITICAL AND MILITARY CAPABILITY.

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C. THE MOZAMBIQUE CHANNEL AND NEIGHBOURING ISLANDS
SOVIET POLICY HERE AIMS AT THE FINAL "DECOLONISATION" OF THE AFRICAN CONTINENT, THE PROVISION OF AIR AND MARITIME STOP-OVER FACILITIES AND THE SETTING UP OF SCIENTIFIC SURVEY STATIONS IN WHAT IS A GOOD AREA FOR ATMOSPHERIC RESEARCH.

(I) MOZAMBIQUE

THE NEW SITUATION IN MOZAMBIQUE, WHERE FRELIMO DOMINATES THE PRESENT TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT AND WILL FORM THE INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT IN JUNE 1975, PROVIDES AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE SOVIET UNION (AND FOR CHINA) TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ITS EXISTING LINKS WITH FRELIMO TO

ESTABLISH AN INFLUENTIAL PRESENCE THERE. THE RUSSIANS CAN BE EXPECTED TO ESTABLISH FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AFTER INDEPENDENCE, PERHAPS PRECEDED BY MISSIONS WITH INTERIM TRADE OR CONSULAR STATUS. THEY MAY ALSO OFFER ECONOMIC AID, AND THEY MIGHT WELL EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF ACCESS TO PORT FACILITIES THERE FOR NAVAL USE. WHETHER THE RUSSIANS WOULD BE GRANTED SUCH ACCESS WOULD, HOWEVER, DEPEND ON A NUMBER OF FACTORS, E.G. WHETHER THE FRELIMO GOVERNMENT THOUGHT THAT THIS WOULD JEOPARDISE FOREIGN CONFIDENCE (WITH REPERCUSSIONS ON MOZAMBIQUE'S ECONOMY): THEIR PROBABLE SECRET

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WISH TO KEEP FAIRLY CLOSELY IN LINE WITH THE "NON-ALIGNED" FOREIGN POLICIES OF TANZANIA AND ZAMBIA: AND PURELY PHYSICAL FACTORS SUCH AS THE EXISTING PRESSURES ON PART FACILITIES. HOWEVER, THERE ARE RECENT RUMOURS ABOUT A RUSSIAN ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN FLEET FACILITIES, POSSIBLY IN NACALA.

(II) TANZANIA

(A) POLITICAL AND MILITARY

THE ONCE PRDOMINANT CHINESE PRESENCE IS NOW ON THE WANE AND MILITARY CO-OPERATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION IS UNDER WAY. DURING THE SECOND HALF OF 1974 TWO SOVIET MISSIONS VISITED THE COUNTRY, RESULTING IN ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AIR FORCE BASED IN TABORA, EXPECTD TO BE OPERATIONAL IN THREE YEARS' TIME. THE USSR DELIVERED TWELVE MIGS 21 (STORED "SOMEWHERE IN TANZANIA" UNTIL TABORA WILL BECOME OPERATIONAL) AND ALSO OFFERED THE NECESSARY TRAINING. IN NOVEMEBER 1974 ABOUT 100 TANZANIANS LEFT FOR THE USSR, FOR AIRCRAFT PILOT TRAINING. THE USSR SEEMS TO HAVE OFFERED ALSO TAINING IN OTHER MILITARY FIELDS, WHICH THE TANZANIAN AUTHORITIES DID NOT ACCEPT. WE KNOW OF NEITHER REPORTS NOR RUMORS CONCERNING USSR ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN FLEET FACILITIES IN TANZANIA, AND IT SEEMS VERY UNLIKELY THAT SUCH ATTEMPTS WOULD MEET WITH ANY SUCCESS, CONSIDERING THE WELL-KNOWN ATTITUDE OF THE TANZANIANS, EVEN TOWARDS NAVAL VISITS. THE CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WAS TO BE LAID DOWN IN AN AGREEMENT TO BE SIGNED DURING THE VISIT OF PODGORNYY, WHICH WAS ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED FOR DECEMBER 1974 AND HAS JUST BEEN CANCELLED. DIS-AGREEMENT ON THE CONDITIONS FOR SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE MAY HAVE BEEN THE REASON. THERE ARE SPECULATIONS, ON THE ONE HADN THAT THE TANZANIAN AUTHORITIES MIGHT PREFER AN AD HOC AGREEMTN TO A FORMAL ONE (PERHAPS UNDER PRESSURE OF THE MILITARY, WHO SEEM NEITHER TO LIKE THE TENDENCY TOWARDS THE USSR, NOR THE EXISTING CHINESE AID), ON THE OTHER HAND THAT THE SOVIET INTEREST RATHER

FOCUSSES ON MOZAMBIQUE WHICH THEY MIGHT CONSIDER TO
BE MORE EASY TO MANIPULATE. FOR THE TIME BEING THE
SECRET

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INTENTION OF THE TANZANIANS SEEMS TO BE TO GET
MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM VARIOUS COUNTRIES, PROVIDED
THIS CAN BE OBTAINED IN THE FORMS AND ON THE
CONDITIONS THEY WISH. THUS THE CANADIAN ASSISTANCE
(TRAINING OF MILITARY AIR TRANSPORT) IS MAINTAINED.
CHINESE SUPREMACY RELATING TO MILITARY AID SEEMS
DECLINING. THE TANZANIANS ARE OBVIOUSLY DISAPPOINTED
ABOUT THE QUALITY OF THE TRAINING AND THE EQUIPMENT
(THE MIG 21 TRUMPS THE CHINESE MIG 11), AND THE
TANZANIAN AND CHINESE PHILOSOPHIES ABOUT THE
ORGANIZATION AND ROLE OF THE ARMY REPEATEDLY CLASHED.
THE CHINESE MILITARY PRESENCE IS DIMINISHING,
ESPECIALLY ON NGERENGERE AIR FORCE BASE, BUT THE
ARMAMENT OF THE TANZANIAN ARMY IS LARGELY CHINESE.

(B) ECONOMIC
THE TOTAL SOVIET ASSISTANCE IS NEGLIGIBLE IN
COMPARISON WITH THAT OF WESTERN AND CHINESE DONORS.

(III) MADAGASCAR
THE NEW REGIME PROPOUNDS A "POLITIQUE TOUS AZIMUTS"
WHICH LEADS TO A RATHER LEFTIST OFFICIAL POLICY.
THE USSR IS MORE ACTIVE THAN IN THE PAST (STILL LESS
THAN CHINESE). AN EMBASSY WAS INAUGURATED IN 1974.
THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR EXPLAINED THAT AID ON
CONCESSIONARY CONDITIONS IS NOT TO BE EXPECTED AT
PRESENT. RUMOUR GOES THAT THE USSR WOULD OBTAIN
FAR-REACHING FACILITIES ON DIEGO SUAREZ, WHICH IS TO
BE EVACUATED BY THE FRENCH. THIS RUMOUR SEEMS
UNLIKELY BECAUSE THE MADAGASCAR AUTHORITIES TAKE A
RATHER NEGATIVE VIEW ON INCREASING SUPER-POWER
PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN.

(IV) MAURITIUS
IN MARCH, THE MAURITIAN PRIME MINISTER, SIR SEEWOOSAGUR
RAMGOOLAM, HINTED THAT HE WAS CONSIDERING GIVING THE
RUSSIANS A BASE ON MAURITIUS. WE BELIEVE THAT THE
MAURITIANS CONTINUE TO REGARD THE RUSSIANS WITH
SUSPICION AND WOULD NOT READILY LET THEM HAVE MILITARY
FACILITIES ON THE ISLAND. BUT RAMGOOLAM IS BECOMING
INCREASINGLY IRRATIONAL AND STUBBORN AND WE CANNOT
ENTIRELY DISCOUNT THIS THREAT. IF, FOR EXAMPLE, HE
SECRET

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CONVINCED HIMSELF THAT THE DIEGO GARCIA ISSUE MIGHT
AFFECT THE OUTCOME OF THE NEXT GENERAL ELECTION IN
MAURITIUS, HE MIGHT ALLOW THE RUSSIANS GREATER

FACILITIES THAN THE BUNKERING FACILITIES TO WHICH THEY HAVE ACCESS AT PRESENT, THOUGH NOT, WE BELIEVE, A FULLY-FLEDGED NAVAL BASE.

(V) AFRICAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS
THROUGH THE OAU, THE SOVIET UNION SUPPLIES THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS OPERATING FROM DAR-ES-SALAAM IN RHODESIA AND SOUTH AFRICA.

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ACTION EUR-12

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OMB-01 SAM-01 NEA-09 EB-07 SAB-01 AF-06 MC-02 SSO-00

NSCE-00 INRE-00 USIE-00 COA-01 /083 W
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FM USMISSION NATO
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D. EASTERN SEABOARD OF THE INDIAN OCEAN

(I) INDIA

INDIA'S SIZE AND POPULATION, HER STRATEGIC POSITION TO THE SOUTH OF THE USSR AND FEARS ABOUT CHINA HAVE ALL MADE HER THE FOCUS OF SOVIET ATTENTION. INDIA HAS FOR SEVERAL YEARS BEEN THE NON-COMMUNIST WORLD'S LARGEST RECIPIENT OF SOVIET ECONOMIC AID AND ONE OF THE LARGEST RECIPIENTS OF MILITARY AID. THE INDO-SOVIET TREATY OF 1971 AND SOVIET SUPPORT DURING THE INDO-PAKISTAN WAR GAVE THE RUSSIANS THE OPPORTUNITY TO STRENGTHEN THEIR POSITION IN INDIA, WHOSE IMPORTANCE TO MOSCOW WAS UNDERLINED BY BREZHNEV'S VISIT IN NOVEMBER 1973, WHEN THE PRINCIPLES OF THE INDO-SOVIET TREATY WERE REAFFIRMED AND A FIFTEEN-YEAR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AGREEMENT SIGNED. NEVERTHELESS THERE ARE POWERFUL CONSTRAINTS ON SOVIET INFLUENCE, INCLUDING THE SIZE OF THE COUNTRY, WHICH CONFERS A CERTAIN IMMUNITY, AND INCREASED INDIAN SELF-CONFIDENCE FOLLOWING THE INDO-PAKISTAN WAR. THE INDIANS PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED BEFORE BREZHNEV'S VISIT THEIR REFUSAL TO GRANT THE USE OF NAVAL BASES TO ANY COUNTRY, BUT THE RUSSIANS ARE HELPING THEM TO CONSTRUCT A BASE OF THEIR

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OWN AT VISAKHAPATNAM.

(II) BANGLA-DESH

IN BANGLA-DESH, THE RUSSIANS STATED ON A STRONG FOOTING; THE INDO-BANGLA-DESH TREATY, MIRRORING THE SOVIET TREATY WITH INDIA, SUGGESTED SOME IDENTITY OF INTEREST BETWEEN THE THREE COUNTRIES, BUT THE PRACTICAL RESULTS HAVE BEEN SMALL. SINCE THE END OF THE 1971 WAR THE RUSSIANS HAVE SUPPLIED SOME TRANSPORT AND FIGHTER AIRCRAFT TO BANGLA-DESH. A SIZEABLE SOVIET MINESWEEPING AND SALVAGE FORCE HAS BEEN OPERATING IN AND OUTSIDE CHITTAGONG HARBOUR AND A RECENT AGREEMENT ENABLES THE RUSSIANS TO KEEP THESE VESSELS IN THE AREA AT LEAST UNTIL JUNE 1974. AS YET, HOWEVER, THEY HAVE NO ACCESS TO PORT FACILITIES ON THE SUB-CONTINENT FOR THE INDIAN OCEAN SQUADRON.

THE STAY IN BANGLA-DESH OF THE SOVIET CREWS OF HELICOPTERS AND TRAWLERS PROVIDED UNDER THE SOVIET AID PROGRAMME HAS BEEN EXTENDED INTO 1975. WORK IS ALSO PROCEEDING ON VARIOUS AID PROJECTS. A NEW SOVIET COMMODITY CREDIT OF 12 MILLION POUNDS WAS ANNOUNCED IN OCTOBER 1974, HALF OF WHICH IS TO BE FREELY CONVERTIBLE.

11. THE OPENING OF THE SUEZ CANAL WOULD SHORTEN THE ROUTE FROM THE BLACK SEA TO THE FISHING GROUNDS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN BY SEVERAL WEEKS, WOULD SAVE COST AND WOULD PROBABLY INCREASE OVERFISHING EVEN MORE. AS IN THE CASE OF SOVIET WARSHIPS AND MERCHANT SHIPS, THE SUEZ CANAL WOULD PERMIT THE SOVIET FLOATING FISH FACTORIES TO MOVE FROM SIBERIAN TO BLACK SEA PORTS, THUS FACILITATING VOYAGES TO THE FISHING GROUNDS TO BE EXPLOITED. IN THIS CONNECTION THE IMPORTANCE OF THE AGREEMENT WITH MAURITIUS SHOULD BE RECALLED. FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF DEEP-SEA FISHING, THEREFORE, THE OPENING OF THE SUEZ CANAL WOULD BE MAINLY OR PREDOMINANTLY TO THE BENEFIT OF THE SOVIET UNION AND WOULD GIVE RISE TO PROBLEMS WITH REGARD TO OVER-FISHING.

12. THIS RESOLUTION WAS TABLED IN 1971 BY INDIA AND
SECRET

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12 AFRO-ASIAN COUNTRIES. IT WAS REACTIVATED IN NOVEMBER 1974. IT HAS BEEN UNANIMOUSLY ENDORSED BY THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE INDIAN OCEAN AND SUBMITTED TO THE MAIN POLITICAL COMMITTEE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. THE DRAFT RES, AMONG OTHER THINGS, CALLS ON THE GREAT POWERS TO REFRAIN FROM INCREASING AND STRENGTHENING THEIR

MILITARY PRESENCE AND ASKS THE LITTORAL AND HINTERLAND STATES OF THE OCEAN TO BEGIN CONSULTATIONS SOON WITH A VIEW TO CONVENING A CONFERENCE ON THE INDIAN OCEAN.

13. DRY KARGOES CARRIED FOR PURPOSES OF FOREIGN TRADE ROSE FROM 855 MILLION TONS TO 1,224 MILLION TONS, I.E. AN INCREASE OF 43 PERCENT IN SIX YEARS. ON THE BASIS OF AN ANNUAL AVERAGE GROWTH RATE OF 8PERCENT FOR THE 1970 DECADE, AS AGAINST APPROX 7.4 PERCENT FOR THE 60S, THE VOLUME CARRIED WITH REACH 2,260 MILLION TONS IN 1980.

14. INDIA IS NOW THE SOVIET UNION'S LEADING TRADE PARTNER IN THE THIRD WORLD, ACCOUNTING FOR NEARLY 2PERCENT OF THE TOTAL SOVIET TURNOVER AND JUST UNDER 11PERCENT OF INDIA'S. WHILE EUROPE CONTINUES TO BE THE MAIN TRADNG PARTNER OF THE COUNTRIES IN EAST AFRICA AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA IN SPITE OF THE CLOSURE OF THE SUEZ CANAL, THE SOVIET UNION IS MAKING IMPORTANT INROADS INTO THE PIECE GOODS, CONTAINER AND BULK GOODS TRAFFIC. ACCORDING TO AN ANALYSIS OF THE NIPPON YSEN KAI HA SHIPPING COMPANY, THE SOVIET UNION WILL POSSESS THE LARGEST PIECE GOOD FLEET OF THE WORLD IN 1975. THE NEW PORT OF ILYETCHOVSK ON THE BLACK SEA IS ALREADY NOW ONE OF THE FIVE BIGGEST PORTS OF ITS KIND IN THE SOVIET UNION, WHILE VRANGELSK ON THE JAPAN SEA IS BEING EXTENDED FOR TIMBER, COAL AND CONTAINER TRAFFIC WITH SHIPS OF UP TO 140,000 TONS.

15 SOVIET ECONOMIC AID TO RED SEA, PERSIAN GULF AND NORTH-WEST INDIAN OCEAN STATES

1954-1973

TECHNICIANS

	AID EXTENDED	AID USED	SECONDED IN
	(IN MILLIONS OF \$ 1973		
	(AT CURRENT PRICES))		

MAURITIUS	5	-	-
SECRET			

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ETHIOPIA	102	18	75
SOMALIA	66	42	675
SUDAN	65	26	25
TANZANIA	20	2	150
INDIA	1,962	1,034	1,600
IRAN	788	417	1,000
IRAQ	554	199	815
PAKISTAN	436	65	150
PEOPLES'S DEMOCRATIC			
REPUBLIC OF YEMEN	14	8	200
YEMENI ARAB REPUBLIC	99	67	105

COURSE: C-M(74)56 OF 11TH SEPTEMBR, 1974
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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 18 AUG 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 21 FEB 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GolinoFR
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975NATO00979
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750286/abbrzjijh.tel
Line Count: 813
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 15
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: A. USNATO 0897 B. STATE 038651
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GolinoFR
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 25 APR 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <25 APR 2003 by SmithRJ>; APPROVED <28 APR 2003 by GolinoFR>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: NATO STUDY ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF REOPENING THE SUEZ CANAL
TAGS: PFOR, MILI, NATO, OR, XF, XG, XI
To: STATE
SECDEF
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006